Abstract-In various resource sharing networks, opportunistic resources with dynamic quality are often present for the users to exploit. As many user tasks are delay-tolerant, this favorably allows the network users to wait for and access the opportunistic resource at the time of its best quality. For such delay-tolerant and opportunistic resource sharing networks, the resource accessing strategies developed in the literature suffer from three limitations. First, they mainly focused on singleuser scenarios, whereas the competition from other users is ignored. Second, the influence from the resource seller who may take actions to manipulate the resource sharing procedure is not considered. Third, the impact of the actions from both the network users and the resource seller on the resource quality dynamics is not considered either. To overcome these limitations, a leader-follower controlled Markov stopping game (LF-C-MSG) is developed in this paper. The derived Stackelberg equilibrium strategy of the LF-C-MSG can be used to guide the behaviors of both the network users and the resource seller for better performance and resource utilization efficiency. Two exemplary applications of the proposed LF-C-MSG are presented, along with corresponding numerical results to verify the effectiveness of the proposed framework.
I. INTRODUCTION

I
N MANY existing and emerging resource sharing networks, in addition to the conventional regular resources, opportunistic resources are often offered by the resource provider and can be exploited by the network users to further enhance their performance. For example, besides the opportunistic spectrum resource exploited in cognitive radio (CR) networks [1] , idle virtual machines may be offered by a cloud service provider as an opportunistic computing resource in cloud-computing networks [2] . Similar examples can be found in applications related to energy harvesting power stations as well, where low-price harvested energy (e.g., the wind or solar energy) are available to consumers opportunistically [3] . Mobile users with different task-accomplishment capabilities provide another instantiation of opportunistic resource in mobile crowdsourcing networks [4] . Two common characteristics of such opportunistic resources are that their qualities may change over time and are often difficult to be predicted accurately, and that a past opportunity usually cannot be recalled and hence users have to make their access decisions online. On the other hand, it is noticed that many user tasks are delay-tolerant. 1 In the presence of resource quality dynamics, such deferrable feature of user tasks provides the users a favorable degree of freedom to wait for and access the opportunistic resource at the time of its best quality. For example, in a CR assisted smart metering network [5] , [6] , smart meters can monitor the spectrum band and transmit when the channel is not occupied. Likewise, in a cloud-computing network, many computing tasks are not real-time requests, and hence the cloud users can wait and then access the cloud server when low-price computing resource is available.
To achieve the best performance in such delay-tolerant and opportunistic resource sharing networks (DT-ORS-Networks), using a proper resource access strategy is crucial to the network users. 2 In literature, some pioneering works have already been done in this direction for different applications. For example, an optimal cloud accessing rule is derived in [11] that can guide a company in choosing a suitable time to migrate its computation assignments to a cloud, whose service quality may fluctuate due to random security events. When the opportunistic resource of interest is the sequentially arriving secondary-users that can serve as relays for primaryusers in CR networks, an optimal relay selection strategy is developed in [12] . In [13] , the dynamism of electricity price and the deferrability of some home applications are exploited to design an optimal electricity usage rule that can balance the electricity expense and waiting time. In [14] , as a more economic-friendly alternative to the conventional direct cellular communication, vehicle-assisted data delivery is proposed for the smart grid, where the smart meter users need to decide whether to hire a certain passing vehicle to deliver its electricity-related measurements to a control center based on the vehicle's task-accomplishment capability (e.g., delivery delay).
These prior works were mainly built on the classic optimal stopping theory [15] , [16] , which can provide the optimal online strategy for a user to access the sequentially arriving resources. Nevertheless, the classic optimal stopping theory is restricted to single user scenarios and may not be suitable for network settings. As noticed in [12] , a substantial amount of collisions will occur when all network users follow the single-user optimal strategy. 3 Considering this, the Markov stopping game (MSG) framework [18] , which extends the classic optimal stopping theory to a game theoretic setting, is employed in [19] to handle the potential competition among users, leading to significant performance improvement. However, there are still two notable limitations of applying MSG to address practical resource access problems in DT-ORS-Networks. Firstly, the resource seller (e.g., a CR access point (AP), or a cloud service provider) in a DT-ORS-Network may manipulate the resource sharing process (e.g., providing a discount to attract more users) to increase its own profit, which may in turn influence the network users' resource access strategy; but MSG fails to capture such interaction between the resource seller and the network users. Secondly, in many applications, the actions from the resource seller and the network users may impose certain impact on the resource quality dynamics (e.g., users' current power consumption influences the amount of available energy in a power station at the next timeslot and thus further affects the future energy price), and such control effect is not included in the MSG modelling.
To address the aforementioned limitations and achieve a more appropriate strategy design, this work further generalizes the MSG considered in [19] to a leader-follower controlled MSG (LF-C-MSG). In particular, the proposed LF-C-MSG consists of two subgames. The first subgame models the interactions between the resource seller (leader) and all the network users (followers) as a single-leader multi-follower game, and the second subgame deals with the competition among network users, taking into consideration the influence of the resource seller's and the network users' actions to resource quality dynamics. In addition, the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) of the proposed LF-C-MSG is derived, which can be used to guide the behaviors of the leader and the followers for enhanced performance.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the proposed LF-C-MSG model is introduced, along with some exemplary applications in DT-ORS-Networks. In Section III, the solution to LF-C-MSG is derived and corresponding applications to two concrete 3 To bypass this multi-user difficulty, a random contention access model is adopted in [17] to simplify the multi-user problem into a single-user one, where a fixed and pre-assigned contention probability is assumed for each user. However, no effective regulation mechanism is provided to prevent selfish users from intentionally increasing their contention probabilities.
resource access problems in DT-ORS-Networks are discussed. Simulation results are presented in Section IV. Section V concludes this work.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND
THE LF-C-MSG MODEL In this section, the proposed LF-C-MSG is introduced first, followed by its applications in DT-ORS-Networks.
A. The LF-C-MSG Model
Before presenting the proposed LF-C-MSG, some background of the classic Markov stopping problem [15] , [16] and the MSG [18] are introduced to facilitate subsequent discussions.
In a classic Markov stopping problem with finite time horizon N, a single player monitors a Markov sequence {X n } N n=1 with state transition probability È(X n+1 |X n ). 4 At each timeslot n, after observing the current state X n , the player decides between two actions: stop or continue. In the context of resource sharing in DT-ORS-Networks, X n corresponds to the current resource quality, and the action stop (continue) corresponds to (not) accessing the current resource. If the player stops at timeslot n, it will receive a reward f sgl (X n ) and the game terminates; otherwise, the player receives nothing and the game continues (unless it is already the last timeslot). The goal of the player is to find an optimal stopping time (or stopping strategy) T * to maximize its expected reward [ f sgl (X T * )]. Mathematically, for a given probability space ( , F , È) and a filtration {F n } N n=1 , 5 a stopping time T is a random variable taking values in the set {1, . . . , N} such that {ω ∈ |T ≤ n} ∈ F n for n = 1, . . . , N (i.e., the stopping decision does not depend on future observations). Under a mild condition for the boundedness of X n , the single player optimal stopping time is given by [15] 
where γ n ess sup T ∈T n f sgl (X T )|F n (with ess sup denoting the essential supremum) represents the optimal expected reward if the player stops no earlier than timeslot n, given observations up to timeslot n; and T n {T |È(T ≥ n) = 1}. Intuitively, (1) says that, when the current reward f sgl (X n ) equals the best reward γ n that can be obtained in the future, the player should stop.
MSG is a multi-player extension of the aforementioned Markov stopping problem [18] . Particularly, in a MSG, multiple rational and selfish players monitor and contend for the same sequence of resource {X n } N n=1 . When multiple players decide to access the resource (i.e., stop) at the same timeslot n, only one of them (chosen uniformly at random by a third-party 6 ) can successfully receive a reward and then leave 4 As in existing literature [11] - [14] , [17] , it is assumed in this work that the transition probability È(X n+1 |X n ) is known as a priori. In practice, such information can be obtained through classic statistical methods [2] , [20] . 5 For example,
) is the natural filtration generated by the observation history. Here, σ ({X i } n i=1 ) denotes the sigma-algebra generated by the random variables X 1 , . . . , X n . 6 Although the proposed framework can incorporate other resource sharing policies (e.g., uniform sharing) with some minor modifications, the discussions in this work will focus on the case of exclusive sharing policy. the game; the rest of the players will continue the game. In the MSG, the set of remaining players R n = {i 1 , . . . , i |R n | } at different timeslot n (1 ≤ n ≤ N) depends on the players' past actions. In principle, the MSG can handle nonhomogeneous players, but the resulting computational complexity will explode [18] and hence homogeneous users are usually considered, which can still cover a wide range of applications in DT-ORS-Networks [19] . Considering this, a similar assumption is adopted in this work and the development of an efficient algorithm to handle non-homogeneous users remains an interesting future work. Under the assumption of homogeneous players, the reward of successfully accessing a resource with quality X n will be denoted by f (X n ), and the optimal resource access strategy will depend on the current state X n and the number of remaining players R n |R n |.
To address a more general class of resource sharing problems in DT-ORS-Networks, the LF-C-MSG is proposed in this work, which further augments the MSG model in two aspects. Firstly, a resource seller (the leader) who can take certain actions to manipulate the resource sharing process is considered in the LF-C-MSG. In particular, for a given resource state X n , the reward f (X n , a S n ) of the network user (the follower) who successfully stops at timeslot n will now depend on the leader's action a S n ∈ A S , where A S denotes the leader's action space; the corresponding reward for the resource seller is denoted by f S (X n , a S n ). Secondly, in the proposed LF-C-MSG, the resource quality dynamics is assumed to be controlled by the actions from both the leader and the followers. More specifically, the resource quality transition probability now becomes È(X n+1 |X n , a n ) with a n {a 1 n , .., a K n , a S n } the joint actions of the K followers and the leader. Fig. 1 depicts the proposed LF-C-MSG model.
B. Applications of the LF-C-MSG in DT-ORS-Networks
The proposed LF-C-MSG described above may be applied to various applications in DT-ORS-Networks. In the following, two concrete examples are presented.
1) CR Assisted Smart Metering:
The first example considers a CR assisted smart metering application. In this application, a group of smart meters [21] (corresponding to the set of followers in the proposed LF-C-MSG model) need to periodically send their data to a control center. To do so, the smart meters can solicit help from a nearby CR AP [5] , [6] . Depending on the number of available CR channels, the per transmission charge set by the AP may change over time, which constitutes the opportunistic resource in this example. To minimize their own costs, smart meters need to compete with each other for the CR resource and strive to access the AP at a low price before the data collection deadline. Any smart meter that fails to access the AP will have to send its data through the usually more expensive dedicated cellular transmission. In addition, the AP may offer some discounts to attract smart meters and promote the usage of CR transmission. In particular, the AP is assumed to be a passive seller, which will offer a discount when no smart meter attempted to access the AP in the previous timeslot. As a result, the quality of the opportunistic resource (i.e., the price of accessing the AP) depends not only on the availability of CR channels but also on the actions of the smart meters. In this sense, the opportunistic resource is controlled by the smart meters.
As will be illustrated in Section III-B.1, this problem can be formulated as a controlled-MSG (C-MSG), which is a special case the proposed LF-C-MSG, and the optimal resource access strategy of the smart meters can be found by computing the Nash equilibrium (NE) of the C-MSG.
2) Opportunistic Cloud-Computing: The second example considers the resource access problem in opportunistic cloudcomputing networks. In such networks, the cloud service provider can offer two types of computing resources: the regular resource and the opportunistic resource [2] , [22] . Particularly, the opportunistic resource can be a set of virtual machines that are currently idle. To increase utilization efficiency, the opportunistic resource can be made available to the cloud users at a price depending on the front-end workload dynamics. To minimize their per-task payments to the cloud, cloud users need to strategically compete with each other for the limited opportunistic resource and strive to access it at the lowest possible price before the task deadline; cloud users that fail to access the opportunistic resource have to purchase the usually more expensive regular resource so as to ensure that their tasks can be completed in time. Different from the previous example, the cloud service provider is assumed to be an active seller, which can tactically decide whether to give a discount or not based on the number of remaining users and their possible resource access strategies, rather than simply based on the users' actions in the previous timeslot.
As will be illustrated in Section III-B.2, this problem can be formulated as a leader follower-MSG (LF-MSG), which is another special case of the proposed LF-C-MSG, with the cloud service provider being the leader and the cloud users being the followers. The optimal strategies of the cloud service provider and cloud users can be found by computing the SE of the LF-MSG.
3) Other Potential Applications: In fact, the proposed LF-C-MSG may assume many other applications in DT-ORS-Networks. For example, in a data center related application, multiple users with delay-tolerant data processing tasks may compete with each other for the resource in the data center, while the resource price may change according to the maintenance cost (e.g., cooling) depending on the user demands and environment fluctuations. To encourage efficient resource utilization and increase profit, the data center may further adjust the resource price and the on-off schedules of its servers. This problem can be formulated as a LF-C-MSG between the data center and the users. The proposed LF-C-MSG framework may also find applications related to energy harvesting power stations (e.g., solar or wind power stations). In such applications, the power station may dynamically adjust the energy price based on the amount of harvested energy (e.g., setting a lower price to promote energy utilization when excessive amount of energy is harvested), and users can smartly schedule their power consumption tasks accordingly (e.g, by decreasing peak-time power consumption) to reduce their electricity bills.
III. SOLVING THE LF-C-MSG
This section presents the method of solving the proposed LF-C-MSG based on backward induction, followed by examples of solving the CR assisted smart metering and the opportunistic cloud-computing problems. Some common notations and symbols are summarized in Table I .
A. Solution to General LF-C-MSG
Our objective is to find the SE of the LF-C-MSG. The underlying principle of solving the LF-C-MSG is to iteratively convert the LF-C-MSG at each timeslot n into an equivalent auxiliary single-stage LF game, and then use the optimal strategies of this sequence of auxiliary games to build the SE strategy of the original LF-C-MSG. More specifically, the proposed algorithm starts from the last timeslot by constructing the auxiliary games for the followers under each possible leader strategy and deriving the corresponding followers' NE strategy. After this, the leader's SE strategy can be calculated based on the followers' NE strategy. Then, this procedure repeats backward in time.
Before proceeding to describe the detailed algorithm, some notations and definitions are clarified first to streamline later discussions. Particularly, consider a LF-C-MSG of finite time horizon N with one leader and K followers. The action spaces of the followers and the leader are denoted by A {stop, continue} and A S , respectively. 7 (For example, in the CR assisted smart metering application, stop means attempting to access the AP and continue means waiting.) The strategy of follower k at timeslot n is denoted by P k n , specifying the probability that player-k decides to take the stop action at timeslot n. 8 Note that, in general, P k n is a function of the current state X n (e.g., the number available channels in the CR related application), the number of remaining players R n , and the leader's action a S n ∈ A S ; but for simplicity, P k n will be used in the sequel, instead of P k n (X n , R n , a S n ), when no ambiguity is incurred. The overall strategy of follower k for the LF-C-MSG is denoted by
, and the set of all the possible strategies P k 's of a follower is denoted by P (same for all the followers due to the assumed homogeneity). Similarly, the leader's strategy P S n (X n , R n , a S n ) specifies the probability that the leader takes the action a S n ∈ A S (e.g., giving a discount) at timeslot n after observing the current resource quality X n and the number of remaining followers R n . Again, P S n will be used in the sequel for simplicity. The overall strategy of the leader for the LF-C-MSG is denoted by
and the corresponding strategy space is denoted by P S .
For a given pair of X n and R n , denote by
) the expected reward of follower i k at timeslot n, when follower i j ∈ R n (the leader) takes action a i j n (a S n ) at timeslot n and then follows strategy P i j n+1 (P S n+1 ) later on. 9 Mathematically, it is defined as
where T i k is the (random) time that follower i k successfully stops under the given strategies; the expectation here is over all the randomness involved. Unlike a follower who only receives at most one reward throughout the entire game, the leader accumulates its reward in every timeslot of the game. Particularly, for a given strategy tuple (a
) , the expected reward accumulated by the leader from current timeslot n till the end of the game is
7 It is assumed in this work that |A S | is finite. 8 Note that whether the player can successfully stop depends further on other players' decisions and the random selection of the third-party. 9 Note that P i k n (P S n ) is used to represent follower i k 's (the leader's) strategy from timeslot n and on. Similar notations will be used throughout the paper.
where
is the number of followers that decide to stop at timeslot m. 10 Based on this definition, the following recursive relation can be readily noticed
where the number of remaining followers R n+1 at the next timeslot is determined by R n ; a n (a
n , a S n ), and
(a i j n+1 ) due to independent decisions of the followers. In addition, the expected reward of a player j (either the leader or a follower) under the strategy-tuple
n ) due to independent decisions of the leader and the followers.
Definition 1: For a given leader strategy P S ∈ P S , a follower strategy-tuple
) forms a NE of the non-cooperative game among the followers, 11 if for all n, X n , 0 < R n ≤ K , i k ∈ R n , and any arbitrary strategy P i k ∈ P , the following condition holds
Remark 1: In general, the NE strategyP i of each follower depends on the leader's strategy P S , but for simplicity,P i will be used, in stead ofP i (P S ).
Definition 2: For a given leader strategy P S ∈ P S , the NE value V j n,X n ,R n ,P S for a player j ∈ R n ∪ {S} at timeslot n and given X n and R n is defined as
Remark 2: Note that when homogeneous followers are considered, V j n,X n ,R n ,P S 's are the same for all j ∈ R n . Definition 3: A follower strategy-tuple
) and a leader strategy 10 ½
is the indicator function for the event that player-i k takes the stop action at timeslot n. 11 Note that when multiple NEs exist, the NE corresponding to the highest reward is chosen.P
form a SE of the LF-C-MSG, if for all n, X n , 0 < R n ≤ K , i k ∈ R n , and any arbitrary strategies P i k ∈ P and P S ∈ P S , the following conditions hold
and
Remark 3: Intuitively, this means that neither the leader nor the followers have the incentive to deviate unilaterally from the SE. In addition, when |A S | = 1, the SE strategy of the followers reduces to their corresponding NE strategy.
Remark 4: An immediate fact from Definitions 1 and 3 is thatP
The SE valueV j n,X n ,R n for player j ∈ R n ∪{S} after observing X n at timeslot n is defined as its expected reward when all the players follow the SE strategy. In particular, for j ∈ R n ∪ {S},
With the above definitions, the method of computing the SE strategy is presented below. Particularly, the procedure of finding the followers' NE strategy for each given leader action is discussed first, and then the procedure of calculating the leader's SE strategy is illustrated.
1) Find Followers' NE Strategy:
It can be verified that, for a given leader strategy (a S n , P S n+1 ), the expected reward
) of follower i k , defined in (2), can be calculated as:
when 1 ≤ n < N. When n = N, it is given by
Remark 5: Take the second case in (11) as an example. When player-i k decides to stop (i.e., a i k = s) and there is at least another player deciding to stop (i.e., S n ≥ 2), playeri k wins in the uniformly random selection and receives a reward f (X n , a S n ) (e.g., the smart meter successfully accesses the CR AP and transmits its data) with probability 1/S n ; and with probability (1 − 1/S n ), some other player wins the selection, and player-i k has to continue to play a (R n − 1)-player LF-C-MSG (e.g., the smart meter has to continue to contend for accessing the CR AP), in which his reward in equilibrium is
by definition. Other expressions in (11) and (12) are derived similarly.
As mentioned at the beginning of this subsection, to compute the NE strategy for player i k ∈ R n at timeslot n when the observation is X n and R n players remain, an auxiliary R n -player non-cooperative 2-action matrix game is constructed for the remaining followers. Specifically, the payoff function of this auxiliary game is defined as
with the right-hand side given by (11) and (12). This auxiliary game transforms the original multi-stage game into an equivalent single-stage game that is easier to solve. Denote the mixed-strategy NE of this auxiliary game byP i k n , representing that player i k takes the stop action with probabilityP i k n when the observation is X n and R n players remain. The corresponding Nash value of the auxiliary game is given bỹ
represents the joint actions of the followers, and the superscript i of a i n is used to differentiate it from the joint actions of the leader and the followers a n = (a
The following proposition provides a recursive construction of the followers' NE strategy (conditioned on the given leader's strategy) of the original LF-C-MSG based onP i k n and shows that the Nash value of the auxiliary gameṼ
actually equals that of the LF-C-MSG
.
Proposition 1:
For a given leader strategy (a S n , P S n+1 ) at timeslot n, ifP N is an NE strategy of follower i k from timeslot n + 1, then the NE strategy of follower i k from timeslot n is given bȳ (15) where • denotes the concatenation operation andP i k n is an NE strategy of player i k in the auxiliary game with payoff function given by (13) . Consequently, the corresponding NE value is given by
Proof: Please see Appendix A. Another interesting fact of the LF-C-MSG and the corresponding NE strategy is given below.
Proposition 2: If the follower's reward function f (X n , a S n ) is always positive and bounded above by some constant f u for all a S n ∈ A S and X n , then there exists a constant K * such that for any K ≥ K * , the followers' NE strategy is to always stop irrespective to the observation X n , the leader's action a S n , and timeslot n (i.e.,P i k n is always 1). Proof: Please see Appendix A. Remark 6: Intuitively, this is because when the number of followers K is large, collisions with other followers is the major impediments for obtaining rewards, and a follower feels pressured (since there are only N pieces of resources) to compete for the current resource rather than to wait and expect a better reward in the future.
2) Find the Leader's SE Strategy: Based on Definition 3, it is not difficult to realize that the SE strategy of the leader is to always choose the action that leads to the maximum value when the followers adopt their NE strategy. This implies that, at each timeslot n,V
In addition, based on Definitions 2-4, the value of the seller V S n,X n ,R n admits the following recursive relation, for n < N,
where the second equality follows from Definition 2; the fourth equality follows from (4) using (14) and (16) . End Find the value of the leader using (18) . Find the best leader's strategy using (19) and set the followers' SE strategyP • Compute the corresponding Nash value V i k n,X n ,R n using (14) and (16) .
End Find the value of the leader using (17) . Find the best leader's strategy using (19) and set the followers' SE strategyP i k n as the corresponding NE strategyP
Proposition 3: The optimal strategy for the leader from timeslot n isP S n P S n •P S n+1 . In particular,P S n is the probability distribution over A S such thatP S n (a S, * n ) = 1, where
Proof: This is straightforward based on the previous discussion. That is, the leader should always choose the most profitable action.
The overall procedure of computing the SE of the proposed LF-C-MSG is presented in Algorithm 1.
B. Proposed Solutions to the Two Examples in DT-ORS-Networks
In the following, the developed LF-C-MSG will be applied to solve the CR assisted smart metering and the opportunistic cloud-computing problems described in Section II-B.1 and Section II-B.2, respectively.
1) Solving the CR Assisted Smart Metering Problem:
To illustrate how to solve this problem using the proposed LF-C-MSG framework, several notations and assumptions are clarified first, which will facilitate our discussion without loss of generality. Particularly, it is assumed that each smart meter has to report its latest measurement to a control center in every N cr timeslots, either through a dedicated cellular channel with per transmission price C dc or resorting to a nearby CR AP for help. It is assumed that the AP monitors M CR channels, whose states follow independent on-off Markov processes with identical state transition probabilities p i j , for i, j ∈ {on, off}; for example, for a given CR channel, p 10 represents the probability that this channel changes its state from "on" (available) to "off" (occupied), and other p i j 's are similarly defined. The bandwidth of each CR channel is assumed to be identical and is denoted by B. Further assume that, at each timeslot, if multiple smart meters intend to access the AP, the AP will use all the currently available CR channels (by combining their bandwidths) to exclusively serve one smart meter chosen uniformly at random. 12 Assuming fixed transmission time τ , the required transmission power of the AP when m CR channels are available is denoted by P m which may be taken as
where N noise denotes the noise power per CR channel, and D is the size of the smart meter data packet. Based on the required transmission power, the AP will set the per transmission price as P m · C cr when m CR channels are available. Moreover, it is assumed that, if none of the smart meters attempted to access in the previous timeslot, the AP will offer a discount 0 ≤ q < 1 (resulting in a price P m ·C cr ·q) for the current resource to attract the interest of the smart meters. This problem can be formulated as a C-MSG. Specifically,
, with 0 ≤ m n ≤ M the number of available CR channels and ½ d n ∈ {0, 1} the indicator of whether a discount is offered by the AP, respectively. It is not difficult to verify that the resource quality transition probability is given by
where S n is determined by a n , and for 0 ≤ i, j ≤ M, È(m n+1 = j |m n = i ) is given by (22) , shown at the top of the next page. The smart meters' reward function is defined as
which represents a smart meter's saving if it successfully accesses the AP instead of using direct cellular transmission. Note that in this problem, instead of considering the possible discount from the AP as an action from a leader, we treat it
as a control effect to the resource quality dynamics from the smart meters, which hence leads to a C-MSG formulation. Therefore, to find the optimal resource access strategy for the smart meters, one can simply invoke Algorithm 1 with A S = {null}.
2) Solving the Opportunistic Cloud-Computing Problem:
For this problem, it is assumed that each cloud user generates a new computing task in every N cc timeslot that has to be completed before the next task arrives, 13 and the required execution time for each task is L < N cc timeslots. Also, when multiple users request the opportunistic resource at the same time, it is assumed that the provider can choose only one of them (uniformly) at random to grant access. 14 Moreover, considering that the front-end workload dynamism in a cloud can usually be modeled as a Markov process [2] , it is reasonable to assume that the prices {X n } N n=1 of the opportunistic resource follow a Markov process with transition probability È(X n+1 |X n ). The time horizon N of this problem is N = N cc − L, at the end of which cloud users failing to access the opportunistic resource have to purchase the regular resource at a usually higher price X reg to meet the task-deadline. Furthermore, a smart cloud service provider that can actively choose between two possible actions A S = {discount, no discount} to maximize its profit is assumed; when a discount is given, the cloud service provider will only charge X n · q cc (0 ≤ q cc < 1) for a resource with original price X n . Consequently, this problem can be formulated as a LF-MSG with the reward function of the cloud service provider given by
and the reward function of cloud users given by
To find the optimal strategies of both the cloud service provider and cloud users, one can invoke Algorithm 1 with
IV. SIMULATIONS
In this section, simulation results are presented to verify the effectiveness of the developed LF-C-MSG when applied to the 13 This is a valid assumption for many practical applications. For example, in geospatial analysis, the geospatial operator needs to periodically process the ample data collected from a set of sensors and the process has to be completed before the arrival of new sensor measurements [23] .
14 Since allowing multiple users to share the same physical resource on the cloud may incur security vulnerabilities [24] , [25] , exclusive resource assignment is assumed in this work.
CR assisted smart metering and the opportunistic cloudcomputing problems, respectively. All the average values presented below are obtained from 1 × 10 6 Monte Carlo runs.
A. CR Assisted Smart Metering
For this problem, it is assumed that each smart meter has to report its measurement in every N cr = 8 (timeslot). The per transmission price of using dedicated cellular channel is set to C dc = 11, while the per unit energy price for CR transmission is set to C cr = 10. In addition, it is assumed that the AP monitors M = 5 CR channels with state transition probabilities p 11 = 0.7, p 00 = 0.2, p 01 = 0.8 and p 10 = 0.3. The resulting resource quality transition matrix is given by (22)). Furthermore, the per channel noise power is set to N noise = 1; the size (number of bits) of the smart meter data packet is set to D = 1; the bandwidth of each CR channel and the transmission time are set such that B · τ = 1. The discount rate is set to q = 0.9. These simulation settings are largely pedagogical, and the change of them will not influence the main points illustrated below.
For this scenario, the corresponding NE strategy computed using Algorithm 1 is presented in Fig. 2 . In particular, Fig. 2(a) shows the NE strategyP n for different timeslot n and number of available CR channels m n , when there is only one follower remains (i.e., R n = 1) and no discount is offered by the AP. Note that when R n = 1, the correspondingP n is actually the single-user optimal strategy, denoted by P sgl in the following. It can be noticed thatP n = 0 in Fig. 2(a) , except for the last timeslot n = 8. This can be intuitively explained as follows: First, it is clear that the best strategy for n = 8 is to stop, otherwise the reward will be zero. For other values of n and m n , it can be verified that, for the specific Tr considered here, the expected number of available CR channels in the future is always no less than that of the current (i.e., [m n+1 |m n ] ≥ m n ) when m n < 4; consequently, the user always prefers waiting to stopping when m n < 4. When n < 8 and m n ≥ 4, due to the (indirect) controllable property of resource quality in this example, the optimal strategy for the user is not to stop 
at the current time but rather continue and expect a discount for the next timeslot. The NE strategyP n of the smart meters when a discount is offered by the AP is shown in Fig. 2(b) . The result shown in Fig. 2(b) conforms to the intuition that a smart meter will take the stop action for a larger range of m n and n in the discount case, as compared to the no discount case. Note that, in contrast to the no discount case, P n always equals one when m n = 5 in the discount case, since this induces the best possible reward to the smart meter. In addition, it can be seen from Fig. 2 that, in the presence of more remaining smart meters, the NE strategy becomes more aggressive. For example, for n = 7 and m n = 3 in the no discount case, when the number of remaining smart meters changes from one to three, the correspondingP n will increase from zero (in Fig. 2(a) ) to one (in Fig. 2(c)) ; likewise, when the number of remaining smart meters increases to five, theP n for n = 4 and m n = 3 becomes one (in Fig. 2(e) ). Similar observations can be made for other pairs of n and m n and the discount cases as well. Intuitively, in the presence of fewer smart meters, each smart meter focuses more on waiting for the best saving chance; while in the presence of more smart meters, competing for the current saving chance becomes more important, considering the risk of failing to obtain a reward due to the high probability of collision. Moreover, for all numbers of remaining smart meters, the stopping ranges (in terms of n and m n ) of the NE strategy for the discount cases are always larger than those of the no discount cases. Average numbers of wasted resource pieces (out of the total N = 8 pieces) in CR assisted smart metering.
In Fig. 3 , for different starting numbers of smart meters K , the average rewardf of a smart meter under the NE strategyP and the average rewardf sgl under the single-player optimal strategy P sgl are compared. The corresponding relative performance gain G (f −f sgl )/f sgl × 100/% is presented in Table II . Several observations are in order. First, it can be noticed from Fig. 3 that smart meters can achieve higher rewards when following the NE strategy as compared to following the single-player optimal strategy P sgl ; for example, as shown shown in Table II , when there are K = 5 users, the NE strategy can provide about 69.2% extra reward as compared to the single-player optimal strategy. In addition, it can be noticed that the relative performance gain G of the NE strategy becomes more substantial as K increases, indicating that it is more crucial for the smart meters to follow the NE strategy when K is large. Another benefit of using the proposed framework is the significantly higher resource utilization efficiency, as evidenced by Fig. 4 , where it can be seen that fewer pieces of resource are wasted when smart meters take the NE strategy, and the performance gap between following NE and P sgl increases with K . 
B. Opportunistic Cloud-Computing
For this problem, it is assumed that each task has to be completed within N cc = 7 timeslots and the required execution time for each task is L = 1 timeslot (i.e., N = N cc − L = 6). It is also assumed that the original price X n follows a uniform i.i.d. distribution (which is a special Markov process) over the set {1, . . . , 10} while the price for the regular resource is set to X reg = 11. In addition, the discount rate q cc is set to 0.85.
Since the cloud service provider is an active seller in this problem, the SE strategy is considered. Particularly, the SE strategy for the cloud users is plotted in Fig. 5 . It can be seen that, similar to the previous example, cloud users need to take more aggressive strategies as the number of remaining users R n increases. Also notice that, since f (X n , a S n ) is always positive and bounded above in this example, the optimal strategy for the cloud users is to always strive Cloud service provider's SE strategy for different R n 's. to access the opportunistic resource when R n exceeds 12 (c.f. Proposition 2), as shown in Figs. 5(h) and 5(g). The SE strategy of the cloud service provider is presented in Fig. 6 , whereP S n = 1 means that discount is offered by the cloud service provider. It can be seen that, in general, the cloud service provider tends to offer a discount at the beginning of the game (i.e., when n is small) and when the original resource price X n is high. In addition, it can be noticed that the cloud service provider is less likely to offer a discount when the number of remaining users is either small (as in Fig. 6(a) ) or large (as in Fig. 6(d) ). Intuitively, this is because, the discount mechanism is beneficial to the service provider only when it can (significantly) reduce the number of wasted resource caused by users' waiting. When R n is small, the major cause of resource waste is the limited number of users rather than their waiting, and hence discount mechanism will not help much. On the other hand, when R n is large, the corresponding resource access probability of cloud users is already high (as shown in Fig. 5 for large R n ), and hence there will be no need for the cloud service provider to use discount to attract cloud users.
The average rewardsf andf sgl when all users employ the SE and the optimal single-user strategies are compared in Fig. 7 , and the corresponding relative performance gain G is presented in Table III . Again, it can be seen that the SE strategy can provide a higher reward to the cloud users than the single-player optimal strategy. For example, as shown in Table III , when K = 8, the NE strategy can provide 58.1% improvement in reward as compared to the single-player optimal strategy. In addition, from the cloud service provider's perspective, the SE can bring a higher resource utilization efficiency, as shown in Fig. 8 . Specifically, it can be noticed that the wasted resource keeps decreasing with the number of users and becomes negligible when K is large, while more than half of the resource will be wasted if the single-user optimal strategy is used regardless the number of users. Using the SE strategy can also bring a better profit to the cloud service provider. This is evidenced by Fig. 9 where it can be seen that the cloud service provider can always obtain a higher profit when discount is smartly offered according to the SE strategy. In addition, it is worth noticing that the extra profit brought by allowing discount decreases when K is either very small or very large. This is because, in either extreme, the cloud service provider tends to give no discount (even though discount is allowed) as shown in Fig. 6 . Also, the profits with and without allowing discount will coincide for sufficiently large K . 15 
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, an LF-C-MSG framework is developed for the DT-ORS-Networks. By following the derived SE strategy, network users can properly handle the resource quality dynamics and the potential competitions from other peers for enhanced performance, and the resource seller can promote more efficient resource utilization and glean more profits, which will eventually lead to a win-win situation for both the network users and the resource seller. Another favorable feature of this framework is that, due to the property of the SE strategy, neither network users nor the resource seller has the incentive to deviate. Applications in the CR assisted smart metering and the opportunistic cloud-computing problems are demonstrated to verify the effectiveness of the proposed framework, and corresponding simulation results show that using the SE strategy of the LF-C-MSG can provide substantial performance gain as compared to using the single-user optimal strategy. Moreover, simulation results indicate that it becomes more important for network users to follow the derived SE strategy as the number of network users increases. As the developed LF-C-MSG framework is rather general, exploring other potential applications in DT-ORS-Networks remains an interesting future direction. During this process, we will also endeavor to reveal some insights for system deign (e.g., whether/when the equilibrium strategies may have a threshold structure).
APPENDIX A PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Proof: To show that (15) gives an NE strategy, suppose that R n followers remain at timeslot n and that follower i k plays according to an arbitrary strategy P 
where the first and the last equalities follow from the definition in (5) , and the first inequality holds sinceP i k n is an NE of the auxiliary game with payoff function given by (13) . To see (*), it is sufficient to show that, for any action- tuple (a i 1 , . . . , a i 
È(X n+1 |X n , a n ) · ½ {S n ≥1} · 
È(X n+1 |X n , a n ) · ½ {S n ≥1} · follows readily from their definitions.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Proof: Since homogeneous followers are considered, the expected future Nash values of all followers are identical. It is not difficult to realize that the expected future reward of a follower (i.e., the reward if the follower does not access the current resource) V f uture can be (loosely) upper bounded by N · f u /(R n − 1), which is monotonically decreasing with respect to R n . Therefore, there exists a large R * such that f (X n , a S n ) ≥ N · f u /(R n −1) ≥ V f uture holds for all R n ≥ R * and all X n . Then it follows that, when K ≥ K * R * + N −1, it can be ensured that R n ≥ R * over the course of the LF-C-MSG (since at most one follower leaves at each timeslot) and hence, the current reward f (X n , a S n ) is always no smaller than the expected future reward V f uture , throughout the game. Then according to (11) and (12), it can be verified that the stop action will always provide no less reward than the continue action. This completes the proof of Proposition 2.
